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Thispaperexaminesthemarketandorganizationalfactorsthatledtothebankruptcy
inJuly2000ofTriValleyGrowers(TVG),aCaliforniatomato-andfruit-processing
cooperative owned by more than 500 growers. TVG’s bankruptcy was caused by
a conﬂuence of organizational and market-related factors including a low produc-
tivity of assets due to high inventory levels and obsolete facilities, high operating
costs relative to competition, high raw product transport costs due to the geographic
mismatch of production and processing capacity, particularly in tomato operations,
and a poor information system. TVG was also highly leveraged. Re-organization as
a new-generation cooperative in 1996 failed to stabilize the equity base.
Introduction
The members of the board of directors of Tri Valley Growers (TVG) faced a
difﬁcult decision. Established value (EV) was a term used by the cooperative to
describe the market value of the products its members delivered. TVG had failed
to pay full EV on the ﬁscal year (FY) 1997 crop and was facing losses upward of
US$100 million in FY 1998. As a grower-owned cooperative, these losses accrued
to the growers. The simplest solution was to charge them against the FY 1998 crop
proceeds, guaranteeing that the growers would again receive far less than EV. But
these were hard times for the growers, and any payment short of full EV would
drive some into bankruptcy and cause others to ﬂee the cooperative in favor of other
marketing options. With such erosion in its member base, how could TVG hope to
survive? The only other option, however, involved carrying the loss forward on
the cooperative’s books, further eroding its precarious equity position towards the
precipice of bankruptcy. The expression “damned if you do, damned if you don’t”
could have been coined to describe this dilemma.
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Background
Formed in 1963 through a merger of Turlock Cooperative Growers and Tri Val-
ley Packing Association, Tri Valley Growers was a California agricultural coopera-
tive association owned by more than 500 member-growers who delivered tomatoes,
peaches, pears, olives, apricots, grapes, and cherries to the cooperative for process-
ing and marketing. TVG’s organization consisted of the cooperative association as
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries: Tri Valley Growers Container
Division, Inc.; S&W Fine Foods, Inc.; Redwood Food Packing Company; Valley
Forklift Company, Inc.; Redpack Foods, Inc.; and International Agribusiness Man-
agement Corporation. TVG operated nine processing plants in California through
the mid-1990s, and a tomato reprocessing plant in New Jersey. In FY 1998, it had
total assets of more than US$700 million, its sales revenue reached US$782 mil-
lion, and its members’ equity was US$125 million. TVG hired more than 9,500
seasonal and 1,500 annual employees. In its heyday, TVG was a leading ﬁrm in
the American food processing industry and commanded substantial shares in the
national market (e.g., more than 50 percent for canned peaches and 10 percent for
canned tomatoes).
Initsearlyyearsofoperations,TVGfacedintensecompetitionandﬁnancialdif-
ﬁculty, but survived by diversifying its business and integrating vertically into can
manufacturing, cold-storage, and trucking. In 1970–1971, a combination of tomato
and fruit products oversupply, general ﬁnancial crisis, and operational problems led
to ﬁnancial losses. In 1974, CEO and President Bill Allewelt established a ten-year
cost-plus contract to supply tomato paste to a national processor/marketer, followed
by the construction of a paste plant in Volta, CA to meet the long-term supply com-
mitment. This long-term contract protected TVG from adverse impacts of input
cost increases, helped to raise capital for expansion, and relieved TVG from direct
competition. The failures and subsequent acquisition by TVG of two cooperatives,
Glorietta Foods and California Canners and Growers, further secured its position as
the state’s largest and most diversiﬁed canner.
TVG traditionally operated a single (general) pool for all crops delivered by its
member-growers, enabling them to share the risks and rewards, and mitigate the
effects of periodic downturns in individual commodities. In June 1983, the pooling
practicewasmodiﬁed.One-halfofthereturnfromeachcommoditywasallocatedto
the general pool, while the remaining half was allocated to a separate, commodity-
speciﬁc pool. The net proceeds from both pools were allocated to the members in
proportion to the EV of the products delivered by each member relative to the EV of
all products in that pool. Proceeds from non-member business were allocated to re-
tained earnings. Tomato and olive growers were consistently subsidized by TVG’s
fruit operations in the 50/50 pooling system, earning higher returns than achiev-Vol. 23[2009] 89
able in stand-alone pools. Figures 1 and 2, respectively, illustrate actual tomato
and peach payments for FY 1983–95 relative to what would have been earned in
commodity-speciﬁc pools.
Prior to restructuring as a new generation cooperative (NGC), TVG operated
a base capital plan, with each member’s equity requirement set as a percentage of
the member’s most recent eight-year-average EV. The equity percentage remained
quite stable over time, in the range of 140–145 percent. Equity requirements were
fulﬁlled either through annual retains or purchases from other equity holders. When
a member’s cumulative equity was greater than the requirement, the surplus was
subject to refund or saleable to another member.
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Description of the Failure
In July 2000, severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties forced TVG to ﬁle a voluntary peti-
tion for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. TVG relin-90 Journal of Cooperatives
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quished its cooperative structure after a group of private buyers bought the company
in February 2001.
Many opinions have been expressed concerning the causes of TVG’s failure,
including: (1) poor management and wrongful conduct by a former CEO; (2) lax
ﬁnancial controls; (3) industry-wide oversupply of tomato products; (4) declining
long-termdemandforprocessedfruits;(5)ﬁnancialconstraintsthatimpededTVG’s
ability to reduce production costs through modernization of processing plants; and
(6) adverse impacts from restructuring as a NGC. The downfall of TVG is analyzed
here with the goal of sifting through the various explanations that have been posited
for TVG’s demise and understanding the lessons to be learned from its failure.
Those seeking an even more detailed discussion should consult Hariyoga (2004).
Conceptual Framework
This analysis of TVG’s failure blends a variety of analytical approaches. It uti-
lizes, for example, the tools of market analysis to study TVG’s position in its key
product markets. Although TVG undeniably faced considerable market adversity,Vol. 23[2009] 91
the role of TVG’s leaders—CEOs and the board of directors—in causing or failing
to prevent the failure is a subject of considerable controversy and disagreement.
Thus, this analysis must also consider principles of management and organization
behavior. Finally, TVG’s situation must also be studied within the prism of the eco-
nomic theory of cooperatives. As many have pointed to the demise of TVG and
other cooperatives as evidence of shortcomings of the cooperative organizational
form, it is key to determine which of TVG’s difﬁculties can be traced back to its
status as a farmer-owned cooperative.
Analysis of TVG’s Failure
TVG’s members in 34 California counties supplied produce to nine processing
plants located throughout California’s Central Valley. Although the market for fruit
and tomato products became increasingly global in the latter half of the twentieth
century, TVG served mainly domestic buyers. Improved distribution of fresh fruits
and vegetables led to increased competition between fresh produce and canned
fruits and vegetables on a year-around basis. TVG’s sales were diffuse. Customers
included retail private label (27 percent of 1995 sales), branded retail (22 percent),
food service (28 percent), government (2 percent), and industrial and contract (17
percent). TVG’s retail brands included S&W Fine Foods, Oberti Olives, Libby and
Libby Lite Fruit, Redpack and Tuttorosso Tomatoes, and Sacramento Tomato Juice.
The diverse market outlets and mostly weak branded products, however, evinced a
lack of focus on core competencies. In tomatoes alone, TVG produced 435 product
items or labels.
Conditions in TVG’s Key Markets
Tomato products represented TVG’s largest product, contributing an average
of 39 percent to annual revenue during 1990–95. However, the market for tomato
products is characterized by large cyclical ﬂuctuations in production and prices,
and prices of tomato products, particularly tomato paste, have been in secular de-
cline since 1981. Three periods of oversupply—1985–88, 1991–92, and 1995–96—
caused inventories to increase and prices to decline considerably. Financial distress
caused consolidations in the industry, but the number of active ﬁrms still remained
relatively large (22 in 2001), and so the industry remained ﬁercely competitive.
Improved processing, storage, and transportation technologies enabled tomato
manufacturers to extend processing beyond the harvest season and to remanufacture
bulk tomato paste more economically into various consumer products at locations
closer to the consumption point. The California tomato processing industry thus
evolved to focus on high-volume bulk paste production, with reprocessing done
elsewhere. Tomato paste became the largest single processed tomato product in92 Journal of Cooperatives
California, with more than 50 percent of the processing tomato crop packed as bulk
paste annually since 1991. TVG was ultimately unable to compete in this segment
and redirected focus to its branded products. Its brands, however, were weak and
brought TVG into direct competition with stronger rivals.
As production shifted into California’s Central Valley, a geographical mismatch
of production and processing facilities stimulated interregional competition among
processors to procure tomatoes. This led to tomatoes being hauled long distances
at high cost. The industry gradually shifted plant locations from urbanized coastal
regionstoCentralValleylocationssoastobetteralignplantlocationswithavailable
production.
While its competitors invested much in plant upgrades and relocation, product
innovation, and promotion, ﬁnancial constraints handcuffed TVG. It had little abil-
ity to obtain additional internal capital from its members because they, too, were
suffering ﬁnancially from poor market conditions. TVG itself was already highly
leveraged, making it difﬁcult to obtain additional debt capital. Thus, TVG’s tomato
production remained poorly aligned with its plant locations relative to the competi-
tion. And its plants had higher operating costs than rival plants. TVG was also un-
able to overcome problems of under-utilization of processing capacity in its tomato
operations due to insufﬁcient volume of raw product.
TVG was better positioned in its fruit processing operations. TVG, Del Monte
Foods, and fellow cooperative Paciﬁc Coast Producers dominated the fruit process-
ing industry in California. Together, they accounted for more than 90 percent of
the state’s processed fruit production, with TVG having the largest share (about 40
percent). On average, fruit products generated approximately 55 percent of TVG’s
annual revenue during 1990–1995, with peaches the largest fruit category, followed
closely by fruit cocktail. TVG sold fruit under its S&W and Libby brands, but sold
most (53 percent) under private labels. TVG’s brands were weak relative to the
dominant Del Monte brand.
TVG also competed with foreign and domestic competitors in the market for
ripe olives. Olive products generated six percent of TVG’s annual revenue during
1990–1995, but were a constant problem for the cooperative because they produced
the lowest sales as a percentage of production of any TVG commodity and caused
a cash drain due to wastewater treatment issues at the Madera processing plant.
Per capita consumption of canned peaches and pears was in long-term decline
due to increased availability and consumption of fresh fruits. Between 1974 and
1990, real FOB prices per standard case of canned peaches and canned pears, as
well as grower real prices and the average processor margin, declined, which caused
some growers and processors to exit the industry. As in the tomato processing in-
dustry, TVG’s competitors in the fruit processing industry invested heavily in can-
nery modernization to reduce processing costs. TVG’s attempts to follow suit wereVol. 23[2009] 93
constrained by the severe losses in the tomato business that drained much of the co-
operative’s ﬁnancial resources. Instead, additional capacity took the form of aging
infrastructure in canneries acquired from defunct competitors. TVG was also at a
cost disadvantage relative to northwest processors in the production of grade-pack
pears.
These difﬁculties notwithstanding, TVG also had key strengths in the processed
fruit business. Fruit operations yielded a higher margin than tomato products, and
most of the fruit business was conducted on a membership basis. Fruit growers had
considerably fewer outside options than tomato growers, and consequently demon-
strated greater loyalty to TVG. Indeed, TVG was able to use fruit (mainly peach)
revenuestosubsidizeitstomatobusinesswithoutadverselyaffectingitsfruitgrower
membership. A question that will never be answered is whether TVG could have
survived solely as a fruit processing cooperative (i.e., if it had chosen early enough
to jettison its tomato and olive operations).
Organizational Upheaval
Long-time CEO and President Bill Allewelt retired in 1985, and his succes-
sor, Travis Mullenix, served for less than two years before being replaced in 1987
by James Saras, previously the chairman of the board of directors. Saras’ ascen-
dancy was controversial. Some viewed it as part of his vision to make the coop-
erative more oriented toward the peach business. Conﬂicts occurred and led to the
replacement of experienced executives with less experienced and, arguably, less
qualiﬁed albeit loyal ones. Operational problems began to emerge and questionable
decisions followed, including a US$40 million lease on a long-obsolete canning
facility in Sacramento. TVG also faced external adversities during this time, in-
cluding the 1989 earthquake that damaged TVG’s warehouses in Hollister at a cost
of US$6.2 million, and a sharp decline in tomato product prices that resulted in a
US$30 million loss in revenue in FY 1992. On 31 January 1992, TVG recorded a
US$12 million liability that reﬂected the estimated cost of retroﬁtting its Madera
olive processing facilities to comply with California’s newly enacted standards for
wastewater ponds.
SarasretiredasCEO/presidentinMarch1994,andcontrolrevertedtoChairman
of the Board James A. Cooley. Saras subsequently claimed that he was tricked into
resigning by Cooley and other board members, and subsequently sued the board.
Despite instability in its upper management and the buffeting that it had received
from external shocks, TVG’s market share in its major commodities remained rel-
atively high and stable (55.1 percent in peach processing, 48.6 percent in pear pro-
cessing, and 8.9 percent in tomato processing). However, its outstanding debt had
risen to US$417 million in FY 1995, with a debt-to-equity ratio of about two. More-94 Journal of Cooperatives
over, as operating and net earnings declined from 1991 to 1994, pool proceeds paid
to members also declined. In pool years 1991–93, tomato growers received less than
100 percent of EV (see ﬁgure 1).
During 1990–1995, 29 tomato growers exited the cooperative. Other growers
elected to convert their business with the cooperative from a membership basis to
a cash contract basis. As the number of member-growers declined, the proportion
of TVG’s purchases from non-members increased rapidly from 1990 to 1996, from
17.5 to 45.7 percent for tomatoes, 2.0 to 71.5 percent for olives, 21.4 to 39.4 per-
cent for peaches, and 20.7 to 24.0 percent for pears. The cooperative was losing
its membership basis. Under the existing equity structure, the exit of members or
the switch from supplying raw product on a membership basis to supplying on a
cash-contract basis would have reduced the cooperative’s equity.
The New Generation Restructuring
In April 1995, Joseph P. Famalette was recruited as CEO/president. He pro-
posed a restructuring plan that encompassed reorganization, recapitalization, and
a new marketing concept. TVG’s organizational problems were reﬂected in high
overhead costs. Revenue per employee was just US$78,000—markedly lower than
the industry average of US$200,000. Famalette’s cost-cutting actions reduced the
number of employees, but also likely had negative impacts on the cooperative’s
ability to generate sales and revenues.
Famalette also proposed restructuring TVG as a NGC. The new structure was
expected to reduce the exodus of members, create a more stable equity base, enable
management to better control the supply of raw product, and facilitate the raising
of additional equity. Members approved the arrangement on 12 July 1996. It was
accomplished through the conversion of revolving equity into permanent equity in
the form of common stock, equity stock, and preferred stock. TVG authorized (1)
2,000 shares of common stock, which represented membership in the cooperative
and a member’s voting rights; (2) 1.8 million shares of Class T (tomatoes) equity
stock; (3) 50,000 shares of Class O (olives) equity stock; (4) 1.5 million shares of
Class F (fruit) equity stock, which consisted of different series (peach, pear, apricot,
and grape); (5) 1.0 million shares of undesignated Class A equity stock; and (6) 1.0
million shares of undesignated preferred stock. Each share of equity stock carried
with it the right and obligation to deliver one ton of a commodity for processing.
Common stock and equity stock were transferable among current member-growers
and other growers who met eligibility criteria for membership set by the board of
directors.
Upon the conversion, TVG’s issued and outstanding stock consisted of: (1) 502
shares of common stock; (2) 781,998 shares of Class T equity stock; (3) 6,497Vol. 23[2009] 95
shares of Class O equity stock; and (4) 313,645 shares of Class F equity stock. The
amount of stock issued relative to what was authorized suggests that the coopera-
tive’s equity, membership, and business volume were still below optimal levels, as
expected by the restructuring program. The Class A equity stock, which would have
represented the cooperative’s entry into new business, and the preferred stock, des-
ignated for outside investors, were never issued. In essence, the NGC restructuring
failed to achieve the base of stable equity capital that Famalette had envisioned.
Famalette attempted to shift TVG’s focus from a “grow, pack, sell” approach to
oneof“market,grow,pack.”Insteadofpackingeverythingthatgrowermembersde-
livered and then try to ﬁnd a “home” for what was packed (i.e., the traditional coop-
erative concept), the new approach sought to determine what the customer wanted
and then provide it (the NGC concept). The strategy also involved introducing a
new price structure that provided quality incentives, introducing new products such
as high-quality peaches packed in a glass jar, creating an international marketing
alliance with Del Monte Group Ltd., and brand advertising.
Acreage-based contracts were replaced by tonnage-based contracts, and a new
pooling arrangement consisted only of separate pools, each of which was associ-
ated with one class of equity stock. A “proﬁtability target,” set annually by the
board, now determined the allocation of returns among the pools. Net returns up
to the proﬁtability target were allocated to each of the pools in proportion to the
established values of the commodity in each pool. Any net returns in excess of
the proﬁtability target were to be allocated among pools to the commodities that
generated the excess amounts.
An operating income (before interest and taxes) of US$43.9 million was re-
ported in FY 1997, nearly double the preceding year, and total pool proceeds paid
to members increased from US$86.9 million in FY 1996 to US$98.1 million in FY
1997. Nevertheless, the FY 1997 payments were less than 100 percent of estab-
lished value. Despite the higher recorded surplus, the member-growers were worse
off relative to the market than in the previous year. In addition, more borrowing
caused the outstanding long-term debt to increase substantially from US$30.1 mil-
lioninFY1996toUS$145.6millioninFY1997,resultinginanincreaseintheratio
of long-term debt to members’ equity, from 0.15 in 1996 to 0.74 in 1997. The ratio
of total bank debt to equity increased from 1.21 to 1.51, well in excess of TVG’s
long-range goal of 0.67. Inventories also rose substantially, from US$347.7 million
in 1996 to US$393.1 million in 1997, mostly in terms of canned and ﬁnished goods.
The situation was actually direr than these numbers revealed. TVG’s auditor,
Deloitte & Touche LLP, warned of an increased risk of inaccurate ﬁnancial report-
ing, noting that TVG did not (1) have a single individual overseeing the accounting
activities for several months, which led to inadequate supervision; (2) sufﬁciently96 Journal of Cooperatives
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staff its collections departments; (3) accurately account for its inventory; and (4)
adequately monitor its cash account.
This was not the ﬁrst warning signal sent by Deloitte & Touche to TVG. In De-
cember 1995, it had warned TVG of a lack of controls that would prevent a double
recording of sales, one when the order was submitted and another when payment
was received. Despite the warning, this problem had not been properly resolved. In-
deed, double recording of sales happened in 1997 and resulted in overstating TVG’s
1997 sales revenues (ﬁgure 3). The drastic turnaround of the reported net earnings,
from a US$19 million surplus in FY 1997 to a US$78.3 million loss in FY 1998,
reﬂected, in part, a correction of the mistake.
Other factors also likely contributed to the FY 1998 loss, including: (1) a larger
than expected crop that led to EVs set too high relative to the marketplace; (2)
pack planning that did not match the marketplace; (3) signiﬁcantly lower market
prices for packed products due to oversupply; (4) numerous personnel and leader-
ship changes; (5) an erosion of interdepartmental coordination; (6) laying off ex-
perienced staff in a drive to reduce overhead; (7) the vacancy of the chief ﬁnancial
ofﬁcer position for a large portion of the year; and (8) the distraction of senior man-
agement from the core business.Vol. 23[2009] 97
Despite the operating loss in FY 1998, members were not immediately affected
because, instead of being charged for their contribution to the loss, they enjoyed
patronage refunds in addition to receiving full EV on raw product delivered to the
cooperative. Instead, TVG carried the loss forward, causing the cooperative’s equity
to decrease and total bank debt to increase. This, in turn, caused the debt-to-equity
ratio to increase sharply from 1.51 in 1997 to 3.50 in 1998. Had the cooperative
allocated the deﬁcit to the members by imposing a charge or paying less than the
EV for the raw product, the ﬁnancial deterioration of the cooperative would have
been prevented. In defending their decision, board members noted that charging the
loss against current grower payments might have led to a massive exodus of mem-
bers, thereby threatening the cooperative’s viability. However, the NGC restructur-
ing should have helped to deter member exodus due to the delivery requirement and
creation of a permanent equity base.
In August 1998, following the announcement of the cooperative’s loss, the
board of directors terminated Famalette and attempted to stabilize the company
by retaining Robert Cook as interim CEO and Timothy Barron as interim president,
working on a new ﬁnancing agreement, initiating a comprehensive search for a
full-time CEO, implementing cost-cutting initiatives, and undertaking a communi-
cation program with members. In September 1998, a class-action lawsuit was ﬁled
on behalf of TVG’s 500 grower-owners against Famalette and Deloitte & Touche.
Both were accused of concealing the losses and “manufacturing” proﬁts to keep up
the appearance that the restructuring plan was succeeding and justify management
bonuses.
In March 1999, TVG hired Jeff Shaw as the new CEO/president, who served
until the cooperative was purchased in 2001. TVG formed an alliance with Bell-
Carter Foods in September 1999 to handle the olive business. Nonetheless, FY 1999
closed with a recorded loss of US$86.2 million (later revised to US$120 million),
and members did not receive full EV for the raw product delivered. The ﬁnancial
problemsmadeitdifﬁcultforTVGtofulﬁlitsobligationsunderitsdebtagreements.
TVG attempted to deal with the ﬁnancial crisis by: (1) restructuring its obligations;
(2) extending the payment terms of the existing contract with its can supplier; (3)
extending grower obligations; (4) developing further cost-reduction plans; and (5)
selling some olive inventories to a third party. TVG also tried to consolidate its West
Coast tomato operations from four to two plants, and shut down its olive processing
plant and exited the olive business. Despite the restructuring efforts, TVG continued
to experience cash ﬂow and liquidity problems. Indeed, by this time the cooperative
had no net equity (see ﬁgure 4) and was insolvent, although not yet technically
bankrupt.
TVG’s losses continued throughout FY 2000, and on 10 July 2000 it ﬁled a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In98 Journal of Cooperatives
Figure 4. TVG Members’ Equity, FY 1969/70–1999/2000
January 2001, the court approved the sale of TVG to John Hancock Insurance and
other buyers, who operated the fruit business through Signature Fruit Co., a John
Hancock subsidiary. Del Monte bought TVG’s S&W brand, and California Olive
Growers, a grower-owned cooperative, bought TVG’s olive business, including the
Oberti brand.
Conclusions
The failure of TVG was due to a conﬂuence of factors, some internal, some
market-related, and others due to the cooperative’s inability or unwillingness to
adapt to a changing environment. Market adversities stemmed from the highly
cyclical nature of the fruit and tomato product market, and were therefore not
unique to TVG. That TVG survived a number of hardships caused by poor market
conditions in the 1970s through to the middle of 1980s, and that peer cooperative
Paciﬁc Coast Producers survives to this day, demonstrates that the failure was not
due to an inherent inability in a cooperative to respond appropriately and survive
such situations.
Nonetheless, the success factors during TVG’s earlier years were due in part to
unique events, such as the cost-plus tomato contract. Likewise, the seeds of TVG’s
subsequent structural problems may well have been sown prior to the 1990s, includ-Vol. 23[2009] 99
ing high processing/marketing costs caused by scale and technical inefﬁciencies in
its processing operations and high shipping costs due to the geographic mismatch
of production and processing. TVG also carried a relatively high debt-to-equity
ratio—an average of 2.6 from 1985 to 1991—into the 1990s. By comparison, the
average ratio of Paciﬁc Coast Producers for the same period was 0.7. TVG’s indebt-
edness raised its ﬁxed costs of debt service relative to its competition and seriously
constrained its ability to generate additional external capital, which, in turn, limited
its ability to undertake programs to reduce costs and/or generate revenues.
External events, such as the earthquake damage and the wastewater problem in
its olive plant, were unique problems to TVG and had cost implications. Lack of
member loyalty was an additional issue, particularly among tomato growers. The
weak performance of TVG’s tomato pool, even with its subsidy from peaches, and
the availability of alternative marketing outlets for tomato growers led to an exodus
of tomato members and a restructuring of tomato contracts, from member con-
tracts to non-member cash contracts. Given TVG’s cost disadvantage in the tomato
business, the only way its cash contracts could be made marketable was through
subsidies from the fruit business.
Famalette’s new generation restructuring should be viewed as a response to the
problems inherited from previous leadership. Nevertheless, the restructuring plan,
particularly orienting marketing towards branded products, was too ambitious be-
causeTVGdidnothavecompetitiveadvantagesoveritsmajorbrandedcompetitors.
TVG’s strength was in retail private-label products. Focusing on branded products
only drained the company’s resources without generating additional revenues. On
the other hand, a diet based mainly on private-label products promised to be a thin
gruel, given the emerging dominance of retailers in the food chain and their power
to extract cost concessions from private-label manufacturers.
Famalette’s equity-restructuring plan also proved to be unsuccessful because
its principal goal, to increase the company’s equity, was not achieved. Capital was
not obtained from outside investors because the preferred stock was never issued
and likely would have held little appeal. Increased common and equity stock shares
were also never realized. Indeed, the equity continued to erode and eventually dis-
appeared completely.
In the end, the NGC structure offered members few advantages over the old
structure. Some of the features of a typical NGC, such as engaging in value-added
processing and restricted membership, had already been part of the old structure.
Although the stock shares were potentially transferable, the transfer was subject to
restrictions and the market was limited, particularly when the commodity pools per-
formed poorly, which was true for tomatoes and olives through much of the 1990s.
Ultimately, the success story of Famalette’s leadership in implementing the restruc-
turing plan, as painted by a Harvard Business School case study (Carter 1997),100 Journal of Cooperatives
proved to be a myth, based on hype and erroneous accounting reports. Although the
new generation structure offers several potential advantages relative to traditional
structures in terms of ensuring stable product deliveries and base of equity, the les-
son of TVG is that it is unlikely to be successful in rescuing a cooperative in distress
because potential members are unlikely to make the degree of commitment that an
NGC structure demands.
Finally, the board’s response to pay members the full EV (and more in some
cases) while the cooperative was operating at a loss gutted the cooperative’s equity.
The laudable goal of such payments, to retain and enhance member loyalty, was un-
likely to be successful because the members’ exodus was tied to chronic structural
problems that could not be solved through a single year’s crop payment.
Consensus as to which factors were pivotal and which were ancillary in causing
TVG’s downfall may never be achieved. TVG’s market position was undoubtedly
not strong at the beginning of the 1990s. It carried a heavy debt burden and it was
not a low-cost competitor in one of its major markets, tomatoes, and held little
hope in the short-term of addressing its cost deﬁciencies. Its other major market,
processed fruits, was stagnant due to changing consumer habits and a proliferation
of fresh produce. Would TVG have weathered the storm, as it had done previously,
if not for the series of managerial mishaps that subsequently unfolded? Or did those
actions just hasten a decline that had already been set in place? Could TVG have
survived as a fruit-processing cooperative had it jettisoned the tomato and olive
operations in a timely fashion?
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